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Abstract
The United States imports around 25% of its merchandise under some form of pref-
erential trade regime. This paper examines both the origins and the consequences of
U.S. trade preferences in the context of the gravity model of international trade. The
main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, it provides estimates of the impact
of preferential trade regimes in terms of access to U.S. markets while controlling for
geostrategic interests that determine the countries that are oﬀered commercial prefer-
ences. Second, we consider not only country eligibility but also the extent of utilization
of these programs. Third, we provide new estimates of the impact of transport and
transactions costs beyond distance. In the standard gravity estimation, we ﬁnd that
beneﬁciaries of these preferences, except GSP, export between 2-3 times more than the
excluded countries, after controlling for country and product characteristics. Nonethe-
less, the estimated eﬀects of these programs are lower when controlling for utilization
ratios and selection biases due to the correlation between geopolitical interests and the
standard explanatory variables used in the gravity model of trade, such as countries’
geographic distance from the U.S.
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The United States, one of the strongest supporters of multilateral liberalization in the post-
World War II era, today imports around 25% of its foreign merchandise under some form
of preferential trade program. Among these are Free Trade Areas (FTAs), such as NAFTA,
and many unilateral preference programs, such as the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)1. The absolute and relative eﬀects of these
various programs are of great interest to many U.S. trading partners, both beneﬁciaries and
excluded countries2.
The eﬀects of preferential trade arrangements, especially bilateral and regional agree-
ments, have been extensively analyzed in the literature3.T h e g r a v i t y m o d e l ,o v e r t h e l a s t
decade, proved to be one of the successful tools in this literature. In their review article
on regionalism and gravity models, Greenaway and Milner [2002] cite over 25 papers, start-
ing with the inﬂuential work of Aitken [1973] and continuing with Frankel, Stein and Wei
[1995]. The standard approach has been to represent membership in a speciﬁc regional trade
agreement through a dummy variable in the bilateral gravity equation4. Although they vary
across papers, the general result is that regional agreements have positive eﬀects on the
volume of bilateral trade among member countries.
We use the gravity model in a similar fashion and focus on several issues that have not
been properly addressed. First, we emphasize the special role played by the U.S. political
and geostrategic motivations in determining which countries receive eligibility. Endogeneity
of preferential agreements is generally an ignored issue, yet a critical one since the granting
1The preferential trade programs we analyze are FTAs (NAFTA and Israel), Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA), and the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
2The latest FTA to be signed by the US was CAFTA (U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement)
which includes El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
3See Bhagwati, Krishna & Panagariya [1999] for a compilation of important papers and Schiﬀ and Winters
[2003] for an extensive review.
4Other studies include various other dummy variables to analyze the eﬀect of comomn history, political
relations etc. See Frankel [1997] for a survey.
2and removal of preference eligibility is quite often a political decision. Both of its neighbors
and a close political ally were the ﬁrst countries to sign FTAs with the US. CBI and CAFTA
are specially designed for a region that the US considers strategically important. Andean
preferences are part of the war against drugs; political conditions are explicitly stated as eligi-
bility criteria for the GSP and the AGOA. Furthermore, recipients’ trade performance aﬀects
the US government’s decisions to extend or cancel preferences through explicit measures and
lobbying of domestic industries. We address these potential endogeneity and selection bias
problems and provide new estimates of the impact of trade preferences on U.S. imports.
Second, we consider not only country eligibility to assess the impact of various programs,
but also the extent of their utilization, which depends on the relevant rules of origin (ROO)
and other compliance costs. The restrictive role of the ROO is frequently mentioned in
the policy literature but seldom analyzed empirically5. W h e nw et a k ei n t oa c c o u n tb o t h
the restrictiveness of the ROO and the endogeneity of preference eligibility, the estimated
impact of preferential market access declines considerably, from around 100-200% to a 20-
80% increase, depending on the program.
Since trade ﬂows can be aﬀected by transport and transactions costs that vary across
products and countries, we provide estimates of the impact of these costs beyond controlling
for geographic distance, a variable that is tightly correlated with U.S. geostrategic interests
and a determinant of the probability of receiving preferences. In the treatment regressions
that control for preference eligibility, distance variable becomes statistically irrelevant in
determining trade volumes while transport costs remain robustly signiﬁcant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of
the various trade preferences oﬀered by the U.S. Section 3 presents the basic econometric
model and describes the relevant indicators and data, including the proxy for the utilization
of the preferential programs. Section 4 discusses the various estimation results, and the main
ﬁndings are summarized in the concluding section 5.
5The utilization ratio is zero for numerous tariﬀ lines under the GSP and only 25% on average. Even for
NAFTA, the utilization ratio is 63% in 1997 and it is below 50% for Caribbean and Andean preferences.
32 Trade Preferences Oﬀered by the United States
In this paper, we analyze both reciprocal arrangements such as FTAs (NAFTA and Israel)
and unilateral preference programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA), and the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Israel was the ﬁrst country to sign an FTA with the
US in 1985 and the long phase-out periods for certain tariﬀ lines were ﬁnally completed by
1995. NAFTA, the most important FTA for the U.S. to date, came into force in 1994. It also
contains various tariﬀ phase-out periods and rather restrictive rules of origin requirements.
Since then, the U.S. signed FTA agreements with Jordan, Singapore, Chile, and recently in
2004 with ﬁve Central American countries. These agreements were not in place in 2001 and
therefore they are not included in our dataset.
Beneﬁciary countries are not required to reciprocate and lower their trade barriers on
their imports from the US in the case of unilateral preference programs, among which the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is the oldest one. It was established under GATT
auspices, whereby many developed countries, including the US and the EU, voluntarily
extend preferences to developing countries. The US implemented its GSP program in 1974
and it covers over 150 countries in our sample. While customs unions and free trade areas are
required by the GATT to cover "substantially all trade" and have internal tariﬀso fz e r o ,n o
such restrictions apply to unilateral programs. Donor countries have complete discretion on
country and product eligibility, granting and removal criteria as well as preference margins.
That is why politically sensitive sectors such as apparel and agriculture are excluded from
GSP and successful exporters are routinely removed as it was the case with several East
Asian countries, such as Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, in 1989.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), Andean Trade Promotion Act (ATPA), and Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are also unilateral programs and have their legal basis
on the same principles as the GSP. However, they are much more generous in terms of product
coverage and involve stronger political commitments from the US. CBI was launched in 1986
4and has continuously evolved. One of the most important changes was the expansion of the
apparel preferences with the Caribbean Basin Trade and Promotion Act of 2000. ATPA
was ﬁrst signed into law in 1991 and was renewed in 2001 under the new title of Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. The main change was the extension of duty-
free access to apparel and footwear exports from Andean countries that fulﬁll certain rules
of origin. The ﬁnal program in our data is AGOA which grants duty and quota free access to
sub-Saharan countries since 2000. 33 countries in our sample enjoy AGOA beneﬁts. Liberal
rules of origin requirements in apparel, even compared to NAFTA, CBI and ATPA, are its
most important provisions .
3 Econometric Model and Variables
The gravity model has been used successfully since the early 1970s (e.g., Aitken [1973])6
to explain the volume of trade between pairs of countries using the distance between them
and their income levels7. The basic gravity equation is frequently enhanced with various
other variables that inﬂuence bilateral trade volume, such as sharing a common language
or a border, being landlocked and membership in international organizations (see, among
others, Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose [2001]; Rose [2003]). Among new applications of the
gravity model are analysis of the impact of currency unions (Rose [2001] and international
institutions on trade volume (Rose [2003] and Wei and Subramanian [2003]).
We modify the standard gravity model along several other dimensions to estimate and
quantify the eﬀects of the diﬀerent U.S. preference programs. The main additions is the
inclusion of variables to capture the impact of trade preference program as explained below.
Second, we estimate the gravity equation at the product level (two-digit HS classiﬁcation)
6Anderson [1979] asserted that “Probably the most successful empirical trade device of the last twenty-ﬁve
years is the gravity equation.” See also the literature review by Anderson and Van Wincoop [2003b].
7Its empirical success lead to eﬀorts to provide theoretical foundations to the gravity equation. Anderson
[1979] is considered as one of the earliest attempts followed by Bergstrand [1989], Anderson and van Wincoop
[2003a] and Eaton and Kortum [2003].
5to capture the varying treatment of diﬀerent product categories under each preference pro-
gram. Third, we include a variable, in addition to distance, to capture transport and various
transactions costs that vary not only across countries but also across products. We explain
the construction of all of our variables in greater detail in the next subsection.
The speciﬁcation of the empirical gravity equation is the following:
ln(Xijt)=α + β1 ln(Incomeit)+β2 ln(Income per capitait) (1)
+β3 ln(Distancei)+β4 ln(Areai)+β5Borderi (2)








σjPj + eijt (3)
Xijt is the value of total exports from country i in product category j to the United States
in year t. The impact of preference program k is captured with the variable Preferenceijtk.
We also add product ﬁxed eﬀects denoted by the variables Pj. This variable aims to capture
various diﬀerences among product categories, such as the MFN tariﬀ rates. We estimate the
above equation separately for 1997 and 2001 to better assess the impact of several preference
programs that came into eﬀect in 2000. We have 173 countries and 98 product categories
for a total of 16,954 observations per year in the dataset tough some of the data is missing
for some of the very small countries. We should note that the majority of the studies in the
literature use aggregate trade volume, rather than sectoral trade. However, there are also
many exceptions that use disaggregated trade volume such as Bergstrand [1989], Feenstra,
Markusen and Rose [2001] and Evenett and Keller [2003]. Furthermore, Anderson [1979]’s
theoretical justiﬁcation for the gravity estimation includes a multi-sector model.
63.1 Data Description
The following are various variables that aﬀect trade and have been used in gravity equations
in the literature. Income and income per capita a r er e a lG D Pa n dr e a lG D Pp e rc a p i t a
in year t for country i. Distance is between country i and the United States in kilometers.
Area of country i is measured in square kilometers. Border is a dummy variable which is 1
if the country shares a border with the US - in our case, only Mexico and Canada. WTO
member is a dummy variable which is 1 if the country i w a si nt h eW T Oi ny e a rt.O f
the 173 countries in our sample, 142 and 152 were members in 1997 and 2001, respectively.
Common language is dummy variable with value is 1 if country i has English as a commonly
spoken language. Island is another dummy variable and is 1 if the country i is an island. The
majority of the above data for these variables is provided by Rose [2003]8 tough we added
some missing observations from the World Development Indicators [2002] of the World Bank.
Sample statistics are provided in Table 1a.
The trade ﬂows, on the other hand, are from USITC, which provides extremely detailed
data on various measures of bilateral trade of the United States with each trading partner
under each preference program at the tariﬀ line level9.T h eexport value, Xijt,i st h eC u s t o m s
Value of all exports from i to the United States in category j in year t (1997 or 2001).
Due to the lack of data, most papers in the literature use the bilateral distance to measure
transport and transaction costs. However, when we use distance as a proxy for all such costs,
we are explicitly assuming that these are uniform across a wide range of products and that the
cost of one kilometer is the same across countries. Our proxy Transport Costs is constructed
as the natural log of the ratio of CIF value (customs, insurance freight) to the customs value.
It is approximately the cost of insurance and freight as a percent of the customs value of
the product and has mean value of 9% in both years. This variable enables us to identify
sector-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc transport and other transactions costs, as opposed to
8Andrew Rose generously provides this data at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm
9See www.usitc.gov.
7other costs associated with geographic distance.
3.2 How to Measure Preferences
For the purpose of our analysis, it is crucial to accurately construct a measure of Preferences.
The United States has various preference programs in place as discussed in a previous sec-
tion. We construct diﬀe r e n tv a r i a b l e sf o re a c hp r o g r a m( F T A ,G S P ,C B I ,A n d e a n ,A G O A )
to identify their absolute and relative impact on the exports of the beneﬁciary countries.
Preference eligibility is determined at the tariﬀ line level in each program. For example, in
the case of GSP, exports of more than 6000 tariﬀ lines with positive MFN tariﬀs are eligible
to enter with zero tariﬀs and 127 countries in our sample receive this preference. Although,
it is possible that not every country is eligible for trade preferences in a given product due to
the so-called competitive need limits, this is rather rare10. There are 21 countries eligible for
CBI, 4 for Andean and 33 for AGOA preferences. There is no overlap between the countries
in CBI, Andean and AGOA but they are all eligible for GSP preferences. The product cov-
erage in these regional programs is wider compared to GSP and rules of origin requirements
are less restrictive. Thus, exporters from eligible countries generally utilize the CBI, AGOA
and Andean provisions rather than those of the GSP. Finally, there are only three countries
in our sample that enjoy FTA preferences as we stated above. FTA is the least restrictive
and most comprehensive market access program due to GATT/WTO requirements and its
reciprocal nature. That is why numerous countries from Chile to Singapore to current CBI
members have been pursing FTAs with the US for years.
The main set of preference variables is comprised of dummy variables for eligibility in
each program. We refer to it as Preference Statusijtk and it takes the value of 1 if product
category j from country i is eligible for preference program k in year t. Although preference
eligibility status of similar tariﬀ lines are highly correlated, it is possible that only a portion
10This is not true for the GSP programs of the EU which discriminate further in favor of least developed
countries.
8of the tariﬀ lines in a product category (we have a total of 98) are eligible. In this case,
we continue to assign a value of 1 if any of the tariﬀ lines in a category are eligible for
that program. This is not a major concern for FTA, CBI, Andean and AGOA since a wide
majority of the tariﬀ lines in a given category are either eligible together or not at all.
However, this generalization poses a problem for GSP since the eligibility is more limited
and idiosyncratic. We address this issue with the second group of preference variables as
discussed below. In the end, we have 90 product categories eligible for GSP and all 98
eligible for FTA in both 1997 and 2001. For the other programs, the Trade Act of 2000
made certain changes. For example, while 87 and 88 categories were eligible for CBI and
Andean, respectively, in 1997, all 98 categories were eligible in 2001. AGOA was not in eﬀect
in 1997 and covers all categories in 2001. Sample statistics are reported in Table 1b.
The second set of preference indicators aims to measure how valuable the preferences
actually are. There is almost a consensus among policymakers that preferential programs
are saddled with many restrictions in the form of rules of origin requirements that impede
their utilization (see Brenton [2003] ). It is frequently reported that in many categories
only around 30% of all eligible exports enter the US and EU under preferences (World Bank
[2003]). As a result, the presence of a preference in a category does not mean much when
the beneﬁciary country cannot take advantage of it. To address this problem, we construct
a variable denoted as Preference Utilizationijtk and calculated as follows:
Preference Utilizationijtk =

   





k CVijtk if i ∈ κ
0 if i/ ∈ κ
(4)
where κ denotes the set of countries eligible for preference program k and CVijtk is the
customs value of exports from country i in category j under program k in year t.T h u s ,
P
i∈κ CVijtk is the total imports of category j in year t that entered the U.S. under the
program k and
P
i∈κ CVijt is the total imports of the U.S. in category j in year t from all
countries that are eligible under program k. Then, PreferenceUtilizationjtk of program k
9in category j in year t is the ratio of all exports entering under the program in that category
to all exports from all eligible countries. If the country is not eligible for the program k, the
variable is equal to zero. The variable is meant to be a measure of the overall utilization
of the preference program in a given category and, therefore, is identical across all eligible
countries. The average utilization ratios are reported in Table 1c. GSP has the lowest
number with an average of 24.9% in 1997 and 19.3% in 2001. Andean Program has an
average of 33.3% (and 24.8%) while the CBI has 45.9% (and 36.1%) in 1997 (and 2001).
FTAs have the largest utilization ratios of 63.3% and 58.1% in 1997 and 2001, respectively.
O n em i g h ta r g u et h a tw es h o u l du s eac o u n t r ys p e c i ﬁc utilization ratio rather than an
aggregate one since each beneﬁciary country has a diﬀerent economic and technical capacity
to overcome the barriers imposed by such rules. More speciﬁcally, smaller and poorer coun-
tries tend to have many disadvantages in this regard. However, our aim is to measure the
overall eﬀectiveness of the preference program in question. Furthermore, a country-speciﬁc
variable would be correlated with the dependent variable, the total exports of the country
in question, and create endogeneity problems.
4 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the full sample estimates of the gravity equation with Preference Status
dummies for each preference program - FTA, GSP, CBI, Andean and AGOA. We have
product ﬁxed eﬀects to capture unobserved sectoral variations (such as product-speciﬁcM F N
tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers) and use robust standard errors. The ﬁrst column is the
standard OLS estimation that is the norm in the literature. One of the main problems we face
is that more than half of the observations have zero trade volumes, which can signiﬁcantly
bias the results. This issue simply arises because most countries, especially smaller developing
countries, export only a few product lines. This might not be a severe problem in many cases
where the focus is on aggregate trade volumes and large countries. However, it is likely that
10as i g n i ﬁcant portion of the observations will have zero trade volume if the gravity equation
is estimated using a large number countries and/or product categories11.
Column 1 in Table 2 presents the results if we were to include all of these observations
in the OLS estimation. Most coeﬃcients have the expected and signiﬁcant signs but their
magnitudes are of suspect. For example, income, distance, common language and island
have rather large coeﬃcients. Transport costs, on the other hand, have a very large and
positive sign. Thus it seems that the inclusion of zeros does creates severe biases in the
estimates.
In order to avoid these biases, we ﬁrst estimate the same gravity equation using only
observations with positive trade volumes and the results are reported in column 2. An
alternative is to use the TOBIT estimator, which is reported in column 3 for 1997. As can
be seen, the results of the OLS estimation with positive observations are very close to the
TOBIT estimation. This is also true for 2001 although we do not report it here. Therefore,
we discuss the TOBIT results as we believe that is the more appropriate solution to dealing
with zero-censored observations.
The corresponding TOBIT estimates show that all preference programs, except the GSP,
have positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects on the exports of the beneﬁciaries. An FTA member
exports almost three times more than a country with identical characteristics12.T h i sn u m b e r
might be rather large since the FTA dummy is highly correlated with the border dummy -
all neighbors of the US have an FTA agreement and the only non-neighbor with an FTA is
Israel. In contrast, the border dummy is not signiﬁcant in our estimation which is generally
not the case in the literature. So it is highly likely that the FTA variable is partially capturing
the border eﬀect13.C B Ib e n e ﬁciaries export 136% more and the same number for Andean
11A sf a rw ec o u l ds e e ,C o ea n dH o ﬀmaister [1999] is one of the few papers which explicitly acknowledges
this issue.
12This calculation comes from the fact that the model is estimated in log-log form, whereas the gravity
model is originally a multiplicative model. So the estimated coeﬃcients can be interpreted at the exponential
(“e”=2.17...) to the beta times the exports from non beneﬁciaries.
13European Union provides a more appropriate analysis of the FTA eﬀect since it has a higher number of
partner countries and does not share borders with large portion of them.
11countries is 42%. On the other hand, GSP beneﬁciaries export 17% less.T h i s c o u n t e r -
intuitive result is consistent with the results reported by Ozden and Reinhardt [2003a and
2003b] on the negative eﬀects of the GSP preferences on the recipients. These results indicate
that preference programs positively aﬀect the export volumes of the beneﬁciary countries
relative to the excluded countries. Furthermore, the eﬀe c ti n c r e a s e sa st h ep r o g r a mb e c o m e s
more generous and less restrictive.
We next look at the explanatory variables commonly used in trade gravity models. Log
Income has a coeﬃcient close to 1 and Log Income per Capita has a slightly negative but
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. These together imply that doubling of the GNP of an exporting coun-
try (while holding the population constant) doubles its exports to the US. This is predicted
by most theoretical models constructed to support the gravity equation (Anderson [1979];
Feenstra et al. [2001]; Evenett and Keller [2002]). Distance has a negative coeﬃcient and
1% increase in distance decreases trade volume by 0.4%. Transportcostsa r ee v e nm o r ei m -
portant with a 1% increase leading to a decline of 2.1%. English speaking countries’ exports
are 40% higher while Islands export 54% more. WTO membershipdo not seem to have an
inﬂuence which is consistent with Rose [2003].
Column 4 reports the TOBIT estimates for 2001. The main diﬀerence is the inclusion
of AGOA, which went into eﬀect with the Trade Act of 2000. Surprisingly, the coeﬃcient
of AGOA is negative and signiﬁcant. A close inspection reveals that this is due to the
high negative correlation between the distance variable and the AGOA dummy - AGOA
beneﬁciaries are, on average, 65% more distant to the US. The AGOA dummy is capturing
the distance eﬀect which becomes positive in this regression! The FTA coeﬃcient is almost
identical to the one from 1997 while the CBI and Andean dummies’ coeﬃcients increase.
This is partially due to the expanded beneﬁts of these programs in 2000 (especially the
relaxation of the rules regarding apparel and several labor intensive sectors) and as well as
the increased experience if the exporters in taking advantage of the preferences. Among the
other variables, Area and Border are now signiﬁcant.
124.1 Preference Utilization
Our second set of results use the Preference Utilization Ratios, instead of the Preference
Status Dummies, as the explanatory variables of interest. As explained above, Utilization
Ratio of a speciﬁc preference program is the ratio of all exports that enter the United States
under that program to all exports of the eligible countries. For example, it is possible that a
product is eligible for preferences from the beneﬁciaries under the GSP provisions but none
of the exporters use the preference and they prefer to pay the MFN tariﬀs. This might occur
because the rules of origin requirements are restrictive or the paperwork is burdensome. In
this case, the presence of the preference is meaningless and the Preference Status Dummy
would not represent the actual eﬀect. On the other hand, Utilization Ratios would be equal
to zero and correctly capture the true eﬀect.
Table 3 presents our TOBIT results when the Utilization Ratios replace Preference Sta-
tus dummies. The results are similar to those discussed in the previous section in terms of
the relative eﬀects of diﬀerent programs. Column 1 has the results for 1997 with product
dummies. FTA and CBI have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients whereas the Andean co-
eﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. A 1% increase in utilization increases trade by almost 1% in an
FTA and by 1.2% in the CBI. However, in practice it seems that utilizing FTA preferences
is easier than for CBI. In fact, the average utilization ratio in is 63% for FTAs and 46% in
the CBI in 1997. Combined with the relevant coeﬃcient estimates, these utilization rates
imply that an average FTA member has around 82% higher exports to the US, as opposed
to 75% for the average CBI beneﬁciary, compared to countries that pay MFN tariﬀs14.W e
believe these numbers more accurately capture the eﬀects of preference programs, especially
in the case of the FTA, compared to results from the previous section. The GSP coeﬃcient
is still negative and an average GSP beneﬁciary exports 35% less.
Another beneﬁt of using utilization ratios is that the FTA utilization variable is not
correlated with the border dummy. This probably contributes to the more reasonable results
14The average eﬀects are calculated by exp(utilization ratio ∗ coefficient) − 1.
13and the border dummy becomes signiﬁcant, consistent with the other results in the literature.
The coeﬃcients of the other gravity variables have the expected coeﬃcients. Log Income
and Log per Capita Income coeﬃcients are close to unity as in the previous section. Sharing
a common language and being an island increase trade by 52%15 and 38% respectively. On
the other hand, 1% increases in distance and transportation costs decrease trade volumes by
0.55% and 2%, respectively.
The results for 2001 are reported in column 2. The main diﬀerence is the addition of the
AGOA utilization variable. Recall that the AGOA status dummy was correlated with the
distance variable and that led to counter-intuitive results in the previous section. However,
the coeﬃcient of the AGOA utilization variable is now positive and signiﬁcant. AGOA
utilization variable has a mean of 0.4% but the trade weighted average is 45.6%16.I f w e
use the former to evaluate AGOA, we see that the program leads to only 5% higher trade
for an average beneﬁciary. Andean Utilization variable’s coeﬃcient is also signiﬁcant and
positive in 2001, especially compared to1997. This is probably due to the fact that the
beneﬁciaries had time to adjust and learn to take advantage of the program in the preceding
years. The net eﬀect is that Andean program beneﬁciaries export 24% more than they would
have without the preferences. The coeﬃcients for FTA and CBI increased slightly but the
average utilization are slightly lower so the average eﬀect of both programs are the same
in 2001. GSP coeﬃcient is still negative but lower in value. Combined with the decline in
the average utilization, the net negative eﬀect of GSP is now 25%. All of the other gravity
variables’ coeﬃcient are similar in value to the results from 1997. The only exception is the
transport costs which indicates trade became more sensitive to these costs.
We try an alternative speciﬁcation in columns 3 and 4. Instead of various country speciﬁc
gravity variables (such as log income, distance, language etc.), we include country dummies17
15This is calculated by exp(0.424)-1.
16This is due to the fact that the two largest export categories from AGOA countries, oil and apparel,
mostly enter the U.S. under the AGOA preferences and there is very little exports in other categories.
17We could not include country dummies in the previous section with Preference Status Dummies since
these are also country speciﬁc.
14to capture these and other unobserved country-speciﬁc factors that might aﬀect the volume of
exports to the U.S.18. In the end, we are left with utilization variables and the transport costs
variable. The results are quite similar to the previous ones. The biggest diﬀerence is with
the coeﬃcients of the CBI variable which is still positive and signiﬁcant but much smaller
in value for both years. According to these new estimates, the impact of CBI preferences is
only an increase of 20% and 22% in 1997 and 2001, respectively, on the volume of exports
to the U.S. This implies that certain omitted country speciﬁcv a r i a b l e sw e r ei n ﬂuencing the
previous results.
4.2 U.S. Geoolitical Interests and the Endogeneity of Preference
Status
Our next set of regressions address the potential role played by U.S. political interests in
determining the which countries get preferential market access. This is generally an ignored
issue in the analysis of the preferential trading arrangements, yet it is a critical one since
the granting and removal of preference eligibility is, after all, a political decision. The
ﬁrst countries to sign FTAs with the US were both of its neighbors and one of its closest
political allies. The CBI program is designed for the countries in the region that US considers
strategically important. Andean trade preference program is an explicit tool in the ﬁght
against drugs in the beneﬁciary countries. On the other hand, removal from GSP is motivated
by politics and other considerations quite frequently. For example, most of the important
exports of Pakistan were removed from the GSP eligibility list during the crisis over its
nuclear weapons tests. However, they were reinstated when the US needed Pakistani help
18We should note that our cross-section of countries and industries is similar to using panel data, but
instead of time we have variation across industries. It is well known that in TOBIT models with ﬁxed
eﬀects, the latter cannot be eliminated by diﬀerencing (across countries, in this case) or by the inclusion of
dummies to capture heterogeneity of means. This is so because in truncated series, the ﬁxed eﬀects are not
additive or multiplicative. The inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects in this context thus introduces a bias in the structural
parameters that is inversely proportional to the number of industries in this case (inversely proportional to
the number of periods in panel data). Fortunately, in this application the number of industries is very high,
which ensures that the resulting biases are negligible. See Honoré (1992) and Arellano and Honoré (2001).
15in Afghanistan.
Endogeneity may also arise if the recipient’s trade policies aﬀect the US decisions over
granting of unilateral preferences. The American exporters who face diﬃculties in entering
these countries’ markets may pressure the US government to use these preferences as a
leverage for reciprocal market access, although the preferences are supposed to be non-
reciprocal. On the other hand, domestic import competing sectors in the US may lobby the
government to remove the preferences from countries who have used them successfully to
increase their exports to the US. This is part of the reason why these programs (CBI, GAP,
Andean and AGOA) are created with limited duration and are reviewed every two years.
We use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to isolate the “treatment eﬀect” of
preferences on trade policy when the treatment or program eligibility itself is endogenous.





0xi,t−1 + ui,t (5)
Since this technique allows only one endogenous variable, we ﬁrst treat CBI, Andean and
AGOA as one program, instead of separate programs as we did previously. We keep separate
dummies for GSP and FTA where we assume they are exogenous. We have Preferencei,t =1
if Preference∗
i,t > 0 but 0 otherwise, and x is a vector of instruments thought to be uncor-
related with ε in equation (1). Because of the discrete nature of Preference Status,t h e
usual 2SLS instrumental variables method may overstate the coeﬃcient estimates. Instead,
we use the well-known “treatment eﬀects” instrumental variables (IV) approach, much like a
Heckman selection model but with observed trade policy outcomes even for those countries
not receiving the “treatment” - CBI, Andean, AGOA in this case. This model assumes εi,t
in (1) and ui,t in (5) are correlated, and we estimate it using maximum likelihood (Greene
[2000]). We thus use values of Preferencei,t ﬁtted from a ﬁrst-stage probit regression as
the optimal instrument for Preference Statusi,t in equation (1). We report traditional
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors.
16Özden and Reinhardt [2002] demonstrate that there are a number of good predictors of
US preference eligibility. These include (a) distance from country i to the United States;
(b) a dummy indicating country i maintains a formal alliance with the United States19;( c )
average annual US total aid per capita to the country during the previous decade; (d) the
geographic location of the country - dummy varaibles for the continental location. We should
note that the US is likely to grant preference eligibility when it also has political alliances
with a target country and likely to remove preferences along with other political sanctions,
a criterion explicitly written into the preference-authorizing statutes.
Table 4 presents the IV estimates of the main equation. Our results are similar to
the ones in table 2 which provides the appropriate comparison. Column 1 is for 2001
and the CBI/Andean/AGOA coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant. The results indicate
that being a CBI/Andean/AGOA beneﬁciary increases your exports to the US by more
than 3 (exp(1.115)) times in 2001. Furthermore, the FTA’s impact is even larger than
CBI/Andean/AGOA. The coeﬃc i e n t so ft h eg r a v i t yv a r i a b l e sh a v et h ep r e d i c t e ds i g n sa n d
values closer to previous estimations. All of the variables in the ﬁrst stage probit estimation
have the predicted and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients as can be seen at the bottom of the
table20.
In the next stage, we assume that FTA eligibility is also determined by geostrategic
interests, thus we treat it together with CBI, Andean, and AGOA. Our new variable takes
the value 1 if a country is eligible for any of these four programs21. Column 2 presents
the results for 2001 and these are very similar to the previous column. Eligibility in these
programs increases the exports of the member countries by more than 3 times in 2001.
19Distance and alliance data are from the Correlates of War Project as distributed by Bennett and Stam
[2000], updated by the authors to 2000.
20We did not report the coeﬃcients of the continent dummies from the ﬁrst stage regression. These are
also all signiﬁcant.
21Estimates from auxiliary Ordered Probit regressions for eligibility for these programs indicate that one
cannot reject the hypothesis that the probability of receiving FTA preference is determined by the same
threshold values of the explanatory variables used in the selection equation (and in the Probit equation of
the treatment regressions) as those that determine the probability of being elegible for the other programs
(CBI/Andean/AGOA).
17Although the coeﬃcients have the predicted signs, these results, we believe, have an upward
bias and further analysis is needed. Unfortunately, utilization ratios can not be used in this
context since the treatment variable needs to be a dummy variable.
4.3 Endogeneity of Utilization Ratios
A selection bias continues to be present when we use the utilization ratios as the proxy for
the extent of preferential market access. In this case, the problem is also related to political
and strategic considerations that inﬂuence the granting of preferences. However, we face an
additional data censoring bias since the preferential exports, hence the utilization ratios, are
only observed for countries and products that are eligible.
Ad i ﬀerent econometric approach is required to provide consistent estimates of the im-
pact of program utilization ratios on the exports to the U.S. Since the bias is due to sample
censoring, we follow Heckman (1979) in estimating a sample selection equation simultane-
ously with the corresponding linear model of exports to the U.S. via maximum likelihood.
The "selection equation" is the same as the Probit equation in the treatment models dis-
cussed above. However, the exports model is estimated with the sub-sample of countries and
products that are eligible for preferential treatment.
Table 5 reports the results derived from the Heckman-selection models. We report two
sets of results. Both use the same selection equation as the one used in the treatment
regressions, but the second excludes the dummy variable for sharing a common border with
the U.S. (i.e., Canada and Mexico) from the log-linear exports equation. This speciﬁcation
produced slightly diﬀerent results that are worth discussing.
Both speciﬁcations indicate that the utilization of FTAs, CBI, and AGOA have positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀects on exports to the U.S., whereas GSP and ANDEAN do not. The main
diﬀerence between the two speciﬁcations is that the impact of the FTAs is much smaller
in the model that includes the common-border variable. These results suggest that the
18impact of NAFTA (the FTA beneﬁtting Canada and Mexico) is a bit diﬃcult to distinguish
from the common border eﬀect. This distinction is made more diﬃcult by the fact that a
common border is in itself an important determinant of the decision by the U.S. to oﬀer
such trade preferences which is suggested by the signiﬁcant eﬀect that this variable has on
the probability of being eligible for trade preferences.
It is worth comparing the results of the regular TOBIT estimation (column 2 of Table 3)
with the Heckman selection model (Column 1 Table 5) to identify the eﬀects of the selection
bias. The most important result is that the coeﬃcients of the FTA, CBI and Andean
utilization varaibles are signiﬁcantly lower in the Heckman Selection model. For example,
the estimates for the impact goes from 84% to 50% for the FTAs and from 33% to 3% for CBI
(when we use average utilization ratios) and the Andean program is no longer signiﬁcant. On
the other hand, the estimated eﬀects of the GSP and AGOA are higher under the Heckman
selection model; GSP no longer has a negative eﬀect and AGOA’s eﬀect doubled. These
results suggest that FTA/CBI/Andean beneﬁciaries are actually beneﬁtting more from the
political alliance variables in the selection equation, and the preferences themselves seem to
be an endogenous response to these geo-strategic considerations. The opposite is probably at
play with respect to the rather large number of countries that beneﬁtf r o mG S Pa n dA G O A .
5C o n c l u s i o n
The main objective of this paper was to identify the impact of various U.S. reciprocal and uni-
lateral preferential market access programs while at the same time control for the geostrategic
motivations of the U.S. Our main conclusion ist h a ts u c hp r o g r a m sh a v ee c o n o m i c a l l yl a r g e
and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the exports of the beneﬁciary countries, but geostrate-
gic and political interests play an important role in determining the probability of gaining
preferential access to U.S. markets. In fact, some of the commonplace results reported in the
existing literature seem to be biased by the exclusion of these non-economic considerations.
For example, exporting countries’ geographic distance from the U.S. is not a signiﬁcant
19determinant of exports to this market in the context of the treatment eﬀects regressions,
where the probability of being eligible for preferential access is endogenously determined by
U.S. geostrategic interests. The signiﬁcance of distance reappeared in the Heckman-selection
models where program utilization is determined by U.S. non-economic motivations, but in
this case the estimated eﬀect of the Andean trade preferences was not signiﬁcant.
Of particular current interest is the ﬁnding that FTA members have signiﬁcantly larger
exports to the U.S. compared to excluded countries. And this eﬀect seems to be larger than
the also positive eﬀects of CBI, ANDEAN, and AGOA. Another important ﬁnding is that
the estimated beneﬁts of preferential market access programs decline considerably when we
take into account the rules of origin requirements and other bureaucratic barriers by using
utilization ratios in the estimations. GSP is the only exception in terms of providing beneﬁts
to beneﬁciaries and seems to have negative eﬀects in several speciﬁcations.
Among the interesting methodological conclusions, the presence of zeroes in the product-
level exports data tends to produce severe biases in linear estimations. These biases are
particularly inﬂuential on the estimated coeﬃcients of some preferential programs, AGOA in
particular, and they also severely biased the impact of distance in the OLS linear regression.
Thus truncated data techniques seem to be more appropriate in this type of application.
The inclusion of a direct proxy for international transport and transactions costs seems to
be quite important in these models. Indeed, all of our estimates of the impact of these costs
on trade volumes indicate that they are economically and statistically important. Moreover,
in the treatment regressions, which also control for the endogeneity of program eligibility, the
distance variable became statistically irrelevant, whereas the direct proxy of international
transport and transactions costs remained robustly signiﬁcant with economically large coef-
ﬁcients.
Undoubtedly, there is need for further analysis of the eﬀects of preference programs and
more to be learned from gravity models in this context. One main limitation of this study
is the focus on U.S. programs. The European Union has similar reciprocal and unilateral
20preference programs in place with a large portion of its trading partners. Furthermore, the
EU programs have diﬀerent eligibility rules and diﬀering preference margins for each country
and their study is bound provide additional insights.
6T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
Table 1a. Sample Statistics
# of positive
observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Log of Trade Volume -1997 7577 13.311 3.628 5.525 24.514
Log of Trade Volume -2001 7744 13.502 3.620 5.533 24.648
Transport Costs - 1997 7300 0.0914 0.111 0.000 1.811
Transport Costs - 2001 7665 0.0905 0.102 0.000 1.386
#o fc o u n t r i e s
w/ data Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Log of Income - 1997 155 22.805 2.461 17.180 29.349
Log of Income - 2001 153 22.925 2.478 17.310 29.362
Log of Per
capita Income - 1997 155 7.582 1.982 3.001 10.675
Log of Per
capita Income - 2001 153 7.536 1.545 4.445 10.941
Log of Distance 163 8.639 0.496 6.981 9.434
Log of Area 166 23.928 8.008 1.871 32.196
Border 173 0.011 0.498 0 1
WTO membership -1997 173 0.821 0.384 0 1
WTO membership -2001 173 0.879 0.328 0 1
Common Language 173 0.364 0.483 0 1
Island 173 0.294 0.457 0 1
21Table 1b. Sample Statistics







CBI - 1997 21 87
CBI - 2001 21 98
ANDEAN - 1997 4 88
ANDEAN -2001 4 98
AGOA 33 98




categories Mean Mean weighted
by trade volume Min Max
GSP - 1997 11430 0.249 0.137 0 0.901
GSP - 2001 11430 0.193 0.107 0 0.761
FTA - 1997 294 0.633 0.595 0 0.993
FTA - 2001 294 0.581 0.547 0 0.996
CBI - 1997 1827 0.459 0.358 0 1
CBI - 2001 2058 0.361 0.419 0 0.990
ANDEAN - 1997 352 0.333 0.163 0 1
ANDEAN -2001 392 0.248 0.175 0 1
AGOA 3234 0.004 0.456 0 1


















































AGOA — — — −0.811∗∗
(0.107)










































































Observations 15190 7365 15190 14994
R
2
0.629 0.538 0.148 0.1617
Product Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regressand: natural log of trade volume
First two columns are OLS w/ product ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors.
Last two columns are TOBIT w/ robust standard errors.
23Table 3. Programs Presented as Utilization Ratios
Model: TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT






















































































Observations 15190 14994 16954 16954
R
2
0.149 0.160 0.221 0.249
Product dummies yes yes yes yes
Country dummies no no yes yes
















CBI / ANDEAN / AGOA 1.115∗∗
(0.184) N/A
ALL PREFERENCES N/A 1.286∗∗
(0.154)
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